A Follow-up to “A Problem with Interactionist Property Dualism”

Yesterday, I posted my response to another blogger’s post regarding Interactionist Property Dualism. Since then, the original blogger has responded, and I find his response particularly enlightening on the matter:

I’m currently interested in Searle’s biological naturalism, which retains some appeal of property dualism but does not define consciousness as a property over and above the brain, but instantiated by the brain. On this model, consciousness is a higher order process of the brain like liquidity is a higher order process of water molecules in a group. So, conscious decisions are possible given this view, but it doesn’t require telling a story about a property called consciousness efficiently causing anything – it would be a story about how certain higher order neuronal processes (called consciousness) control other, lower order processes (muscle contractions).

The original “spark” that caused the novel movement would probably be a combination of novel environmental factors (including interaction with other people) with different neuronal factors. I don’t think we need a first cause which is an irreducible, non-material property called consciousness; although I see your point.

My next response is far less enlightening, but for any who care:

I’ll admit, I find Searle’s idea much more plausible than any that invokes true dualism. Seeing how this connects to everyday intuition, if even possible, will be interesting, though. At any rate, you’ve given me another avenue to explore, so thank you for that. I’ll certainly be keeping an eye on any future posts you have regarding philosophy of mind and consciousness.

For the original post, please click here for the original blogger’s site, or here for my original posting.